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BETWEEN PEACE AND THE AIR-SEA BATTLE
A War at Sea Strategy
Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.
“Land-sea wars” have significant maritime dimensions, with command 
of the sea posited by this study as mattering more than either [land 
combat] skill or strength. . . . [C]ommand of the sea is a preeminent form 
of power that determines the outcome of land-sea conflicts.
JOHN ARQUILLA
 In a February 2012 article published in the American Interest, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, and Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, 
Chief of Naval Operations, provide solid justification for more closely integrat-
ing Air Force and Navy capabilities into an Air-Sea Battle strategy.1 We applaud 
the Air-Sea Battle component as the most effective means of preparing for the 
most challenging conflict—full-scale conventional war. We propose, however, an 
intermediate strategy, one providing American leadership additional flexibility to 
avert the need to exercise the potentially escalatory strikes that the Air-Sea Battle 
strategy may require. Predicated on American relative strengths, particularly in 
the undersea domain, it is a “war at sea” strategy.
A war-at-sea strategy’s purpose is to provide U.S. political leadership less in-
trusive ways to deter war and inspire allied engagement in peace. It is a maritime 
strategy confining conflict to the sea without land invasion or strike, thereby 
diminishing the threat of escalation. The strategy affords leadership the means 
to reinforce any relationship between the United States and China, whether co-
operation, competition, confrontation, conflict short of war, or war. In this short 
article we describe the ends, ways, and means of the strategy, why its adoption 
provides more options for deterrence, and how it plays to American strengths.
THE STRATEGY’S ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS
The war-at-sea strategy’s ends are to deter Chinese land or maritime aggression 
and, failing that, deny China the use of the sea inside the “first island chain” 
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(a conceptual line from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines) during hostilities. 
The ways are distant interception of Chinese shipping, widespread submarine 
attacks and mining inside the first island chain, offensive attacks by a flotilla 
composed of small missile-carrying combatants to fight in the China seas and 
patrol vessels for maritime interdiction at straits and choke points, and Marine 
expeditionary forces positioned to hold the South China Sea islands at risk, with 
no intention of putting ground forces on China’s mainland.2 The means are a 
force structure with a better combination of conventional air forces, battle-group 
ships, and submarines, and a forward-deployed flotilla of U.S. and allied small 
combatants. 
Thus, by plying long-standing American maritime strengths against China’s 
dependence on the seas, the strategy is intended to retain our nation’s peaceable 
influence in the western Pacific for many years to come.
The war-at-sea strategy is also, however, a catalyst for peacetime engagement. 
It implies an adaptable force structure, a deployment plan, logistics capability, 
and allied collaboration. Accordingly, a critical peacetime component includes 
engaging Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Philippines, South Korea, and 
Japan. While engagement may take many forms, increased maritime-security op-
erations, especially with the flotilla, can aid these nations’ maritime governance 
operations to counter terrorism, piracy, smuggling, and illegal, unregulated, 
and underreported fishing. These vessels would also prevent seabed exploration 
contrary to international law, while at the same time providing valuable tactical 
experience for the crews. 
MORE OPTIONS FOR DETERRENCE
The capacity for sea denial within the first island chain and executing a distant 
blockade would provide American leadership graduated options before under-
taking the potentially escalatory step of strikes on mainland China. We believe 
that maritime options may be a more credible deterrent than Air-Sea Battle’s 
deep-strike capability, if China perceives our leadership as being more willing 
to employ them in response to aggression within a maritime exclusion zone or 
in territorial disputes. A strategy of maritime interdiction or blockade has been 
criticized as too slow-acting. A war-at-sea strategy, however, affords time for 
passions to cool and opportunities for negotiation in which both sides can back 
away from escalation to a long-lasting, economically disastrous war involving full 
mobilization and commitment to some kind of decisive victory—in other words, 
World War III. In addition, if potential allies within the Pacific basin realize we 
intend to exercise “at-sea only” strategic options that lessen the likelihood of 
Chinese attacks on their homelands, they may be more willing to maintain and 
expand partnerships with the United States.
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A tenet of the maritime strategy is that no U.S. Navy actions will be initiated 
except in response to claims by China contrary to international law. Our empha-
sis on influence and peacekeeping embraces the notion that we stand ready to 
respond should China assert hegemonic claims that interfere with the freedom of 
the seas so aggressively that both commercial enterprises and sovereign govern-
ments expect the U.S. Navy to act in their behalf.
A MARITIME STRENGTH: UNDERSEA CAPABILITIES
By exploiting our superior undersea forces within the first island chain, we neu-
tralize China’s advantage of its extensive cruise and ballistic-missile antiaccess 
forces. U.S. and allied submarines, operating where large U.S. surface ships would 
be at risk, deny Chinese submarines, warships, logistic ships, and commercial 
traffic safe passage through the East and South China Seas. A combination of the 
following activities affords American policy makers an array of choices:
• The “shock” destruction of a prominent Chinese warship, like that of the 
Argentine cruiser General Belgrano by HMS Conqueror in 1982, mak-
ing clear the Royal Navy’s intention to enforce a maritime exclusion zone 
around the Falkland Islands
• Tracking and sinking all Chinese submarines at sea except ballistic-missile-
carrying boats
• Sinking Chinese surface warships at sea
• Mining some or all Chinese warship bases and commercial ports, with our 
submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles
• After establishing exclusion zones for all commercial shipping, sinking 
anything found inside them, while preserving routes for innocent, friendly 
traffic into East Asian states.
Flotilla Capabilities. Augmenting our undersea forces with small, missile-
carrying surface combatants will challenge China’s targeting capabilities, even 
supposing it would expend its advanced ballistic and cruise missiles on such 
low-value targets. We draw from workshop discussions—with representation 
from the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War College—to suggest 
three prominent employments: 
• Hit-and-run raids on Chinese seabed exploitations that are contrary to 
international law
• Escort of vital shipping into friendly ports, especially in the South China Sea
• Augmentation of Japanese patrol vessels to constrain illegal interference by 
China near the Senkaku Islands.
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What would the flotilla look like? In rough terms, we envision individual small 
combatants of about six hundred tons carrying six or eight surface-to-surface 
missiles and depending on soft kill and point defense for survival, aided by off-
board manned or unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and tactical scout-
ing.3 To paint a picture of possible structures, we contemplate as the smallest 
element a mutually supporting pair, a squadron to comprise eight vessels, and the 
entire force to be eight squadrons, of which half would be in East Asian waters. 
The units costing less than $100 million each, the entire force would require a 
very small part of the shipbuilding budget.4 
Maritime Interdiction or Blockade. Interdiction would in most instances be our 
first action to indicate the seriousness of the U.S. government in response to 
interference with free trade or other belligerent actions by China contrary to 
international law or conventions. Maritime interdiction can be graduated from a 
small number of inspections through seizure of select cargoes, such as crude oil, 
up to a full blockade. We envision blockade as imposed at the Singapore, Sunda, 
and Lombok Straits, as well as, to the extent feasible, the Luzon Strait. Carrier 
battle groups can safely cover these interdiction operations. To be most effective, 
cooperation of Japan and Singapore will be essential, and that of Indonesia and 
the Philippines desirable. If the interdiction moves away from choke points—for 
example, off the coast of Burma—aerial surveillance from littoral combat ships, 
land bases, or both seems desirable.
Holding the South China Sea Islands at Risk. The presence of Marine expedi-
tionary forces and their amphibious ships station forward in the western Pacific 
provides a unique capability to keep Chinese-held South China Sea islands, par-
ticularly those in dispute, at risk. During peacetime, their presence, by balancing 
force in the region and signaling American commitment, may motivate peace-
ful resolutions to disputes over exclusive economic zones; increase engagement 
opportunities exercises with the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore; 
and provide an asymmetric threat in response to a Taiwan invasion. In the event 
of war these expeditionary forces would deny use of South China Sea islands 
and exploration of the seabed through quick-reaction raids, land-to-sea missile 
attacks from concealed sites, ground and air surveillance, and other collaborative 
island employment with allies.
Less Reliance on Communications. Our undersea forces will be less vulner-
able to cyber and electromagnetic attack by operating in ways that exploit the 
“silent service’s” long-standing advantages. Flotilla ships would operate in 
stealthy, semi-silent fashion as MGBs, MTBs, and PT boats have done in the past. 
Tactically offensive, yet operationally defensive, the war-at-sea strategy leverages 
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the stronger form of warfare at sea, the offense, and allows for less concern on 
command-and-control interruption as it promotes individual and independent 
tactical actions for cumulative effect. Conventional air and sea forces that must 
employ active modes of search and communication will at first be assigned to 
support the distant blockade, thereby keeping them outside Chinese antiaccess 
and area denial targeting. If Chinese land attacks on U.S. or allied forces ashore 
require the United States to reply with the Air-Sea Battle’s deep strike capabili-
ties, then our ships and aircraft would move into position to execute their mis-
sions with well-rehearsed methods of deception and networking. 
WISHING DOES NOT MAKE A STRATEGY
The assertions in favor of developing a war-at-sea strategy are hypotheses. Fur-
ther analysis, war gaming, and policy discussions must be united to answer the 
following questions:
1. Can the United States effectively deny China’s use of the South and East 
China Seas in the event of all-out war at sea without attacks on land-
based forces by either side? 
2. Before the war-at-sea strategy is adopted for the indefinite future, the 
United States must confirm the affordability of the Navy forces that would 
create a maritime no-man’s-land within the first island chain. What do 
the time-phased, programmatic details look like?
3. Attacks on bases would be an expansion of the war to the land, so the 
more secure the bases the less temptation to attack them. Where are 
the best locations at which to base submarines and support flotilla 
operations?
4. Can China counter this war strategy by threatening attacks off U.S. west 
coast ports and in the Pacific trade routes, essentially implementing a 
war-at-sea strategy of its own? 
5. For what other combat and noncombat operations might the flotilla be 
more cost-effective than traditional battle-group combatants? Patrolling 
and fighting in coastal waters will continue to be the most frequent tasks 
for the twenty-first-century U.S. Navy. Until we can carry part of the 
burden with our own flotilla, we must rely on our partners around the 
world or employ more expensive, multipurpose, blue-water combatants 
for maritime security operations.
6. Will a war-at-sea strategy have a better chance to deter, delay, or constrain 
conflict with China than land-attack strategies?
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7. Last, how do we disseminate the change of structure of our strategy in 
a way that maintains influence in the western Pacific? We suggest, for 
unity of effort among the U.S. armed forces and our partners in Asia, 
that the strategy be openly published. China will not like it, but it is a 
peacekeeping strategy, not at all a manifest for aggression.
CONSUMMATION
We have cited Professor John Arquilla on the significance of sea power, as 
Arquilla’s analysis looks at land-sea wars after 1815. He gives the classic nineteenth-
century maritime strategists’ advocacy of sea power fresh credibility by validat-
ing the continuing efficacy of maritime superiority in contemporary times with 
current data and quantitative analysis. 
Close integration between U.S. air and maritime forces with resilient com-
munications and the ability to attack in depth are desirable goals for both the 
Air-Sea Battle and war-at-sea strategies. Our emphasis is on America’s maritime 
superiority, ways to exploit it, and by implication the hazards to the nation and 
the world should it be lost. Inserting a war-at-sea strategy as an intermediate step 
preceding the threat of full conventional war—and adjusting force structure to 
achieve it—will provide American leadership a more robust portfolio for engag-
ing China and strengthening our alliances in the emerging age of the Pacific.
N O T E S 
1. Norton A. Schwartz and Jonathan W. 
Greenert, “Air-Sea Battle,” American Interest, 
20 February 2012. The epigraph is from John 
Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, 
and the International System (Washington, 
D.C.: Crane Russak, 1992). 
2. The flotilla of small vessels as an entirely 
new component for inshore operations was 
popularized by Sir Julian Corbett in Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy in 1911. He 
foresaw the inability of battleships—the “cap-
ital ships” of their day—to operate inshore 
in the face of the evolving threat of torpedo 
boats and submarines. See pp. 121–23 of the 
1988 republication of Corbett’s masterwork 
by the Naval Institute Press. 
3. For comparison, a PHM (or patrol combatant 
hydrofoil, a type discarded by the U.S. Navy 
in 1993) carrying four Harpoons displaced 
250 tons; coastal patrol ships (PCs) now op-
erating in the Persian Gulf are of either three 
or four hundred tons; and the coastal mine-
sweepers (MSCs) once stationed in Sasebo, 
on Kyushu, in Japan, displaced 450 tons.
4. For example, supposing a unit cost of eighty 
million dollars in series production and as-
suming a mere ten-year service life, a force of 
sixty-four vessels would cost about $500 mil-
lion per year to sustain, or a bit over 4 percent 
of the probably diminished Ship Construc-
tion (Navy), or SCN, budget.
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